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JURY TRIAL IN WILL CASES IN MINNESOT.4

JURY TRIAL IN WILL CASES IN MINNESOTA
By EDWARD S. BADE*

T

study of Minnesota cases' involving testamentary capacity
and undue influence in the execution of wills is made to
evaluate the comparative results of trying these issues to the
court and trying them to a jury. For convenience in tabulation,
the issues are treated separately, the issue of undue influence
being treated first, and testamentary capacity last. It is, of course,
well known that the two issues are commonly raised together,
and that the issue of fraud is often added. This study does not,
however, include the issue of fraud except as it may be regarded
as inherent in undue influence.
It is now well settled in Minnesota, notwithstanding Fischer v.
Sperl,2 that in appeals 3 to the district court, there is neither a
constitutional nor a statutory right to a jury trial of these issues.'
Indeed, it has been decided, that even though the court has impanelled a jury in the case, the court may, after the issues have
been submitted to the jury and before it has decided them, withdraw the case from the jury and itself decide the issues." If,
however, the issues are submitted to the jury, and it brings in
either a general or a special verdict, then under the Minnesota
practice, the verdict has the same effect as a verdict in an action
at law.6 The verdict is not merely advisory. But the court may
deal with the verdict in these cases just as it may in jury actions
Iis

*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'A complete table of all the cases considered is appended at the end of
this study. It is believed that it includes all cases involving the issues discussed decided in Minnesota and reported through Vol. 274 N. W. If any
are inadvertently omitted, the writer welcomes the correction. It should be
noted that some of the cases cited represent two trials of the issues. Cases
of undue influence which do not involve the issue of testamentary capacity
are indicated by an * so as to obviate the necessity of repeating the citations in the supplementary table of cases involving that issue.
2(1905) 94 Minn. 421, 103 N. IV. 502.
3

These appeals are in fact trials de novo.

Minnesota, Laws 1935, ch.

72, sec. 169. This was true also under the prior Probate Code.
4Grattan v. Rogers, (1910) 110 Minn. 493, 126 N. W. 134; Lewis v.
Murray, (1915) 131 Minn. 439, 155 N. W. 392; In re Estate of Enyart.
(1930) 180 Minn. 256, 230 N. W. 781. Indeed, the Fischer v. Sperl case
would seem to be contra to the earlier case of Schmidt v. Schmidt, (1891)
47 Minn. 451, 50 N. IV. 598 in which Mr. Justice Mitchell wrote the opinion of the court.
-

5

See cases cited in footnote 4 supra. In the case of Lewis v. Murray,

the jury had been out 49 hours without agreeing on a verdict.
: 6(1931) 15 MiN-EsoTA LAw RviAv 478.
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at law. In a proper case, it may set it aside and grant a new trial,
and may even grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict.?
Although the submission of these issues to a jury is discretionary, in twenty-three trials involving the issue of testamentary
undue influence, out of fifty-eight, a jury was impanelled. Thus
a jury was called in for the trial of this issue in more than 39 per
cent of all trials of that issue. The jury did not, however,
determine the issue in that percentage of the cases. In three
of these cases," the court directed a verdict. On the issue of undue
influence, these cases must be counted as determined by the court.
In three more of these cases,0 the court withdrew the issues from
the jury and itself decided them, and in each of these cases the
action and decision of the lower court was sustained. These cases
must, therefore, also be counted as court cases. Thus in seventeen
out of fifty-eight, or substantially 29 per cent of the trials, the
issue was actually left to a jury.
How do the results of jury trial of the issue of testamentary
undue influence compare with the trial of like issues by the court ?"'
7

To do this, the statutory prerequisites must be observed. Mason's 1927
Minn. Stat. sec. 9495. Wilcox v. Wiggens, (1926) 166 Minn. 124, 207
N. W. 23. And see footnote 18 post.
8
Schuch v. Arneson, (1934) 190 Minn. 504, 252 N. W. 335; In re
Brown's Will, (1888) 38 Minn. 112, 35 N. W. 726; In re Nelson's Will,
(1888) 39 Minn. 204, 39 N. W. 143. In the latter case, a verdict was directed on the issue of undue influence only, the issue of testamentary
capacity being left to the jury.
9
In re Estate of Enyart, (1930) 180 Minn. 256, 230 N. W. 781; Grattan
v. Rogers,.(1910) 110 Minn. 493, 126 N. W. 134; Lewis v. Murray, (1915)
131 Minn. 439, 155 N. W. 392. In the latter case the jury had been out
forty-nine hours without agreeing when the issues were withdrawn. All
three are authority for the proposition that there is no constitutional or
statutory
right to a trial by jury of these issues.
9
"The original trial of these issues by the probate court, where all
trials are without a jury, is disregarded in this study as throwing no light
on the matter. The Minnesota constitution does not require probate judges
to be law trained, (Minnesota constitution, art. 6, sec. 7.) and many are
not. It is stated that on December 1st, 1934, fifty out of eighty-seven
of these judges were not members of the bar. 1935 Minnesota State Bar
Association Proceedings 67. For that reason and also because appeals
from the probate court are in reality trials de novo before the district
court, the hearings on these matters are usually a perfunctory fulfillment of
a prerequisite to the real trial in the district court. When the probate
court hearing is not thus perfunctory, it is likely to be a fishing expedition to find out what evidence the other side will be able to produce
at the appeal or real trial, with each side exerting itself to conceal as
much of its evidence as it can. Hence these preliminary skirmishes cannot
be regarded as of any significance. A reversal of the probate court is
these matters cannot be regarded as a reflection on its ability, because, as
indicated, the issues are seldom fully tried there. On the other hand,
should not the fact that jury trials of these issues are not allowed in
the probate court be a broad hint to the district court that the trial of
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To come to a reasonable conclusion on that point, it is necessary
to evaluate some of the cases and eliminate others altogether.
Thus, verdicts and decisions reversed chiefly or solely for error
in rulings on the admission or exclusion of evidence are eliminated
because it is a risk common to both methods of trial. 0 A reversal
or setting aside of a verdict for error in the charge is counted
against trial by jury because it is a risk of trial by jury, but it is
not counted against the jury as a fact finding body. Other special
evaluations of cases will be noted in the text.
On the basis of this realignment and elimination, we have
fifteen jury trials left. In four of these cases" the district court
set the verdict aside and granted a new trial on the ground that the
evidence did not warrant the verdict, which action on the part of the
court was sustained. 2 In one case, the lower court refused to set
the verdict aside and grant a new trial and the supreme court held
the evidence did not warrant the verdict and ordered a new trial.'
Fischerv. Sperl 4 and the second trial of Boynton v. Sintnwiw '
may be discussed together. The first of these cases was tried to
a jury which found against the will. The trial court then
granted judgment for the will notwithstanding the verdict. This
action of the lower court was reversed. A reading of the opinion
by Mr. Justice Jaggard constrains one to think that he, at least,
felt that the contestants had a statutory or constitutional right to
trial of the issues by a jury. If so, the opinion ignored what had
been said by Mr. Justice Mitchell in an earlier case,' and the
decision is limited in a later case'7 where it is explained that the
decision in the Fischerv. Sperl case went merely to the propriety
these issues in that court by way of appeal, should also be by the court

without
a jury?
'0 The cases here eliminated for this cause are: Burmeister v. Gust,

(1912) 117 Minn. 247, 135 N. XV. 980; McAllister v. Rowlan, (1913) 124
Minn. 27, 144 N. W. 412, 36 Ann. Cas. 1006 (jury cases); In re Brown's
Will, (1888) 38 Minn. 112, 35 N. W. 726 (in this case the court directed
a verdict, and hence it is counted as a court case.)
"Buck v. Buck, (1913) 122 Minn. 463, 142 N. W. 729; Buzalsky v.
Buzalsky, (1909) 108 Minn. 422, 122 N. W. 322; Estate of Mumm, (1929)
177 Minn. 226, 225 N. W. 102; Estate of Shell, (1925) 165 Minn. 349, 206
N. W.
457. *
12The Shell Case, (1925) 165 Minn. 349, 206 N. W. 457 was again
tried to a jury, the second verdict being like the first. The second verdict
was allowed to stand and is counted in favor of jury trial. See footnote 21
post.3
1 In re Hess' Will, (1892) 48 Minn. 504, 51 N. V. 614, 31 Am. St.
Rep. 665.
14(1905) 94 Minn. 421, 103 N. W. 502.
15(1926)
166 Minn. 65, 207 N. W. 189.
' 6 Schmidt v. Schmidt, (1891) 47 Minn. 451, 50 N. W. 598.
'.Lewis v. Murray, (1915) 131 Minn. 439, 155 N. XV. 392.
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of granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The reversal
of the lower court would seem, therefore, to turn on a question
of practice. 8 It seems clear, that had the lower court set aside
the verdict and granted a new trial, that action would have been
sustained. 19 Hence the Fischer v. Sperl case is counted against
successful jury trial.
Boynton v. Simmons was twice tried to a jury and each time
reversed ;20 on the first trial for error in charging the jury, a
common risk of jury trials. The court, however, said the evidence warranted the verdict found. Hence, while this trial may
be charged against jury trial on the first point, it cannot justly be
charged against the jury as a fact finding body. The appeal on
the second trial is like the case of Fischer v. Sperl on the question
of practice. The lower court granted judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, and was reversed. The supreme court also held that
the evidence sustained the verdict, and directed that a new trial
should be granted only on grounds other than the sufficiency of
the evidence. The second trial of this case must, therefore, not
only be counted in favor of the jury as a fact finding body but
it seems just also to count it against trial by the court. This
leaves seven cases tried to a jury, all of which were affirmed by
the supreme court. These seven 2 ' successful trials constitute 46.7
per cent of the cases counted as jury cases. If the two jury cases
previously eliminated2" were to be counted, the seven successful
trials would put the jury's score at 41.2 per cent successful.
If the two Boynton trials23 are counted in favor of the jury as a
fact finding body, its score is raised to 60 per cent. If we take
iSThis and the Boynton Case, (1926) 166 Minn. 65, 207 N. W. 189 after
its second trial can be evaluated only in the light of Mason's 1927 Minn.
Stat. sec. 9495 and its progenitors, which makes a motion for a directed
verdict at the close of the evidence a prerequisite to a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. See Wilcox v. Wiggens, (1926) 166 Minn.
124, 207 N. W. 23 and cases there cited. It does not appear that the prerequisite motion was made in either of these two cases. On the other hand,
the court does not expressly base its reversal on this omission.
19A new trial resulted from the reversal in Fischer v. Sperl.
20(1923) 156 Minn. 144, 194 N. W. 330; (1926) 166 Minn. 65, 207
N. W. 189.
21In re Estate of Shell, (1925) 165 Minn. 349, 206 N. W 457 (on
second trial); In re Estate of Mollan, (1930) 181 Minn. 217, 232 N. W.
1; Reed v. McIntyre, (1902) 86 Minn. 163, 90 N. W. 319; In re Pinney's
Will, (1880) 27 Minn. 280, 6 N. W. 791, 7 N. W. 144; Moe v. Paulson,
(1915) 128 Minn. 277, 150 N. W. 914; Storer v. Zimmerman, (1881) 28
Minn. 9, 8 N. W. 827; In re Estate of Olson, (1929) 176 Minn. 360, 223
N. W. 677.
"2Footnote 10, supra.
"3Footnote 20, supra.
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into consideration the risk of jury trial other than error in rulings
on evidence, 24 the score of the jury stands at 53.3 per cent successful.2 5 Again if the two eliminated jury cases were to be
counted in, the score would stand at 47.1 per cent successful.
It must be said that the record of jury trials of the issue
of testamentary undue influence is not good in any view. But is
the record of the court any better? As we have seen, 40 - 0 of the
58 cases are to be regarded as tried by the court-a small fraction
less than 69 per cent. The decision of the court was reversed in
three of these trials. 2 That gives it a score of sustained results
in 92.5 per cent of the cases. If we count the second trial of the
Boynton v. Simmons case 8 against the court, the score stands
0
at 90.2 per cent,2 9 and if In re Brown's WillP
is also counted in
against the court, the score still stands at 88.1 per cent successful
trials. Thus the best view of the jury's record falls far below
the severest view of the court's record in the trial of testamentary
undue influence.
The issue of testamentary capacity is usually coupled with
that of undue influence, and this was true in forty-tvo of the
fifty-eight trials considered under the latter issue. Testamentary
capacity was found to be involved in twelve additional cases, in
which undue influence was not involved. Thus we have fifty-four
trials of testamentary capacity for consideration. In twenty, or
about 37 per cent of these trials, a jury was impanelled. But
again, in six of these cases the jury was not allowed to decide
the issue; in three," a verdict was directed on the issue of testamentary capacity, and in three,3 2 the issues were withdrawn from
24
This computation counts the first Boynton trial against the jury and
the second
trial in its favor even tho there was a reversal.
25
This basis of scoring would seem to be the fairest appraisal of the
jury trial.
26The basis for this figure is to be found in notes 8, 9, and 10 supra and
text passim. If the second trial of the Boynton v. Simmons case is counted
against the court, as it will be later, the number of trials will be forty-one
as a 27basis for computing the score.
Kennedy v. Kelly, (1912) 119 Minn. 531, 137 N. V. 456; Bush v.
Hetherington, (1916) 132 Minn. 379, 157 N. W. 505; Tyner v. Varien,
(1906) 97 Minn. 181, 106 N. W. 898. The affirmed cases are not separately
listed.
The cases will be found in the table of cases at the end of this study.
28
See footnote 20, supra and text passim.
29
This figure would seem to be a fair appraisal of the court trials.
3°See footnote 10, supra and text passim.
31Fischer v. Sperl, (1905) 94 Minn. 421, 103 N. W. 502 (verdict directed on issue of testamentary capacity) ; Schuch v. Arneson, (1934) 190
Minn. 504, 252 N. W. 335; In re Brown's Will, (1888) 38 Minn. 112, 35
N. W.
32 726.
These three cases are the same cases withdrawn on the issue of undue
influence. See footnote 9, supra.
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the jury and decided by the court. Thus in only fourteen of the
cases, or substantially 26 per cent, did the issue of testamentary
capacity actually go to the jury.
The results in these fourteen cases are appraised as follows:
In one33 the lower court set the verdict aside and granted a new
trial for errors in rulings on evidence. Another 3 ' was reversed
by the supreme court on the same grounds. On the basis of
evaluation adopted on the issue of undue influence,"" these two
cases are eliminated from further consideration except as later
specially noted. In one,36 the lower court granted a new trial on
the ground that the jury did not properly consider the evidence.
Another" was reversed by the supreme court for error in the
charge to the jury. Thus we have two reversals, one of which is
to be charged against the jury as a fact finding body. This leaves
ten trials of this issue in which the jury's findings were approved.
Thus the jury has a score of sustained results in 83.3 per cent
of these twelve cases. Its score in these cases as a fact finding
body stands at 91.7 per cent. And if all the reversals are counted
against it, its score still stands at 71.4 per cent of sustained
results. 3' This gives the jury a good record in the trial of testa-

mentary capacity.
Perhaps the difference in the jury record on the two issues
considered is explained in part by the fact that in two of the
cases39 here counted in favor of the jury on the issue of testamentary capacity, the lower court granted a new trial on the
issue of undue influence only, letting its finding of testamentary
capacity stand, and in one 40 of these cases, the lower court directed
a verdict in favor of the will on the issue of undue influence.
One of the sustained verdicts seems clearly to be a sympathy
4
verdict, but the fact is the lower court and the supreme court '
allowed it to stand. Let it be noted also, that while the record
of the jury on the issue of testamentary capacity is much better
33
McAllister v. Rowland, (1913) 124 Minn. 27, 144 N. W. 412, 36
Ann. 4Cas. 1006.
3 Hammond v. Dike, (1890) 42 Minn. 273, 44 N. W. 61, 18 Am. St.
Rep. 35
503.
See footnote 10, supra and text passim.
36
177 Minn. 226, 225 N. W. 102.
7 In re Estate of Mumm, (1929)
3 1n re Layman's Will, (1889) 40 Minn. 371, 42 N. W. 286.
38Perhaps the number of trials of the issue of testamentary capacity is
too small for a fair appraisal of jury trials of this issue. In a lesser degree,
perhaps the same can be said of jury trials of the issue of undue influence.
"Buck v. Buck, (1913) 122 Minn. 463, 142 N. W. 729; In re Estate of
Shell,
(1925) 165 Minn. 349, 206 N. W. 457.
40
1n re Nelson's Will, (1888) 39 Minn. 204, 39 N. W. 143.
411n re Estate of Weber, (1925) 163 Minn. 389, 204 N. W. 52.
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than its record on the issue of undue influence, a smaller percentage
of all the cases in which capacity was an issue and also a smaller
number of cases in which capacity was an issue were submitted
to a jury than was the case in respect to the issue of undue
influence.
Now as to the record of the court in testamentary capacity
cases. This issue was tried to the court in forty cases, in thirtytwo of which this issue was coupled with the issue of undue
influence. One4 2- was reversed for error in rulings on evidence
and hence must be eliminated from further consideration. Another 43 must be eliminated as dealing merely with a question of
practice. This leaves thirty-eight trials for appraisal. In four"
of these there was a reversal, and an affirmance in thirty-four.
This gives the court a score of sustained results in 89.5 per cent
of the cases. If the Fischer v. Sperl case is shifted from the
reversed to the affirmed column, as it fairly should be,45 the
court's score stahds at 92.1 per cent of sustainable results. Thus
the court has a uniformly good record in the trial of both issues.
The jury has a good record on the issue of capacity and a
distinctly bad record on the issue of undue influence.
In view of these results, should the issue of testamentary undue
influence and capacity be submitted to a jury? In Schmidt v.
Schmidt 6 Mr. Justice Mitchell said that at that time the usual
practice was to submit the issue (of will or no will) to a jury.
He also said that it was
"also true, that in theory at least, such an issue is one eminently
fitted to be submitted to a jury, although in practice it must be
admitted that the result is not always satisfactory, for the question
with the jury in such cases is very apt to be, not whether the
instrument is the will of the testator, but4 7whether it is such a
will as they think he ought to have made."
Eminent writers on the subject agree 48 with Mr. Justice Mitchell.
42

re Brown's W.ill, (1888) 39 Minn. 112, 35 N. W. 726.
Buck v. Buck, (1914) 126 Minn. 275, 148 N. W. 117. An order
denying
a new trial on the issue of testamentary capacity was affirmed.
44
1n
43

Bush v. Hetherington, (1916) 132 Minn. 379, 157 N. W. 505; Kennedy

v. Kelly, (1912) 119 Minn. 531, 137 N. W. 456; In re Estate of Waggner,
(1927) 172 Minn. 217, 214 N. W. 892; Fischer v. Sperl, (1905) 94 Minn.
421, 45
103 N. W. 502.
See footnotes 14 to 19 inclusive, supra and text passim. A further
reason for counting this case in favor of the court on the issue of testamentary capacity lies in the fact that the supreme court seemed satisfied
with the decision of the latter issue.
46(1891) 47 Minn.451, 50 N. W. 598.
47(1891) 47 Minn. 451, 456, 50 N. W. 598, 600.
4S2 Schouler, Wills, Executors and Administrators, 6th ed., sec. 802.
Atkinson, Wills 92, 93. See also Borland, Wills and Administration 225.
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Perhaps the conclusion to be drawn herefrom for future practice
is that whenever a district judge feels that his capacity for deciding
these issues is less than that of an average jury, he should call in
TABLE OF CASES CONSIDERED IN THIS STUDY
'Undue influence cases decided by the court. The cases in which testamentary capacity was not also involved are indicated by an asterisk (*).
In the cases not so marked, both issues were present.
Schuch v. Arneson, (1934) 190 Minn. 504, 252 N. W. 335.
*Estate of Eklund, (1932) 186 Minn. 129, 242 N. W. 467.
Estate of Conway, (1932) 185 Minn. 376, 241 N. W. 42.
Estate of Lande, (1931) 183 Minn. 419, 236 N. W. 705.
Estate of Enyart, (1930) 180 Minn. 256, 230 N. W. 781.
Estate of Miller, (1930) 180 Minn. 70, 230 N. W. 275.
Estate of Mumm, (1929) 177 Minn. 226, 225 N. W. 102 (on second trial).
Estate of Hallan, (1929) 176 Minn. 456, 223 N. W. 771.
*Estate of Keeley, (1926) 167 Minn. 120, 208 N. W. 535.
Will of Nagel, (1926) 167 Minn. 63, 208 N. W. 425.
Estate of Christ, (1926) 166 Minn. 374, 208 N. W. 22.
*Estate of Jenks, (1925) 164 Minn. 377, 205 N. W. 271.
Lynch v. Rasmussen, (1923).156 Minn. 100, 194 N. W. 318.
Estate of Jernberg, (1922) 153 Minn. 458, 190 N. W. 990.
Rasmussen v. Evans, (1921) 150 Minn. 319, 185 N. W. 297.
Estate of Wood, (1921) 150 Minn. 218, 184 N. W. 955.
Seiler v. Henle, (1921) 150 Minn. 86, 184 N. W. 564.
Estate of Olson, (1921) 148 Minn. 122, 180 Minn. 1009.
Estate of Larson, (1919) 141 Minn. 373, 170 N. W. 348.
*Kroschel v. Drusch, (1917) 138 Minn. 322, 164 N. W. 1023.
Bush v. Hetherington, (1916) 132 Minn. 379, 157 N. W. 505.
Lewis v. Murray, (1915) 131 Minn. 439, 155 N. W. 392.
Woodville v. Morrill, (1915) 130 Minn. 92, 153 N. W. 131.
*Chamberlain v. Gordon, (1915) 129 Minn. 523, 151 N. W. 529.
Crowley v. Farley, (1915) 129 Minn. 460, 152 N. W. 872.
Kennedy v. Kelly, (1913) 123 Minn. 259, 143 N. W. 276 (on second
trial).
Kennedy v. Kelly, (1912) 119 Minn.. 531, 137 N. W. 456.
Collins v. Dowlan, (1912) 118 Minn. 214, 136 N. W.- 854.
Kletschka v. Kletschka, (1911) 113 Minn. 228, 129 N. W. 372.
Grattan v. Rogers, (1910) 110 Minn. 493, 126 N. W. 134.
Church of St. Vincent De Paul v. Brannan, (1906) 97 Minn. 349, 107
N. W. 141.
*Tyner v. Varien, (1906) 97 Minn. 181, 106 N. W. 898.
Clarity v. Davis, (1904) 92 Minn. 60, 99 N. W. 363.
Cady v. Cady, (1903) 91 Minn. 137, 97 N. W. 580.
*Hogan v. Vinje, (1903) 88 Minn. 499, 93 Minn. 523.
Little v. Little, (1901) 83 Minn. 324, 86 N. W. 408.
*Will's Estate, (1897) 67 Minn. 335, 69 N. W. 1090.
Schmidt v. Schmidt, (1891) 47 Minn. 451, 50 N. W. 598.
*Mitchell v. Mitchell, (1890) 43 Minn. 73, 44 N. W. 885.
In re Nelson's Will, (1888) 39 Minn. 204, 39 N. W. 143 (testamentary
capacity left to jury).
Re Brown's Will, (1888) 38 Minn. 112, 35 N. W. 726.
2
Unde influence cases tried to a jury:
*Estate of Mollan, (1930) 181 Minn. 217, 232 N. W. 1.
Estate of Mumm, (1929) 177 Minn. 226, 225 N. W. 102.
Estate of Olson, (1929) 176 Minn. 360. 223 N. W. 677.
*Boynton v. Simmons, (1926) 166 Minn. 65, 207 N. W. 189 (court
granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict).
*Estate of Shell, (1925) 165 Minn. 349, 206 N. W. 457 (second trial).
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a jury to assist him. Others will do their duty, decide the issues
themselves and save the public the expense of a jury trial, and
the parties the expense and trouble of trying the issues twice in
substantially half the cases.
Estate of Shell, (1925) 165 Minn. 349, 206 N. W. 457.
*Boynton v. Simmons, (1923) 156 Minn. 144, 194 N. W. 330.
Moe v. Paulson, (1915) 128 Minn. 277, 150 N. W. 914.
McAllister v. Rowlan, (1913) 124 Minn. 27, 144 N. W. 412, 36 Ann.
Cas. 1006.
Buck v. Buck, (1913) 122 Minn. 463, 142 N. W. 729.
*Burmeister v. Gust, (1912) 117 Min. 247, 135 N. W. 980.
*Buzalsky v. Buzalsky, (1909) 108 Minn. 422, 122 N. W. 322.
Fischer v. Sperl, (1905) 94 Minn. 421, 103 N. W. 502 (court granted
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of undue influence and
directed a verdict on the issue of testamentary capacity.)
Reed v. McIntyre, (1902) 86 Minn. 163, 90 N. W. 319.
*Hess' Will, (1892) 48 Minn. 504, 51 N. W. 614, 31 Am. St. Rep. 665.
Storer v. Zimmerman, (1881) 28 Minn. 9, 8 N. W. 827.
Will of Pinney, (1880) 27 Minn. 280, 6 N. W. 791, 7 N. W. 144.
3Cases of testamentary capacity nwt coupled with rendue influence, tried
by the court:
Estate of Jensen, (1932) 185 Minn. 284, 240 N. W. 656.
Estate of Gordon, (1931) 184 Minn. 217, 238 N. W. 3-29.
Estate of Waggner, (1927) 172 Minn. 217, 214 N. W. 892-.
Estate of Knopf, (1924) 160 Minn. 480, 200 N. W. 632.
Schleiderer v. Gergen, (1915) 129 Minn. 248, 152 N. W. 541.
Buck v. Buck, (1914) 126 Minn. 275, 148 N. W. 117.
Geraghty v. Kilroy, (1908) 103 Minn. 286, 114 N. W. 838.
Coates v. Semper, (1901) 82 Minn. 460, 85 N. W. 217.
Cases of testamentary capacity iwt coupled with undue influece tried
by a jury:
Estate of Weber, (1925) 163 Minn. 389, 204 N. W. 52.
Sheeran v. Sheeran, (1905) 96 Minn. 484, 105 N. W. 677.
Hammond v. Dike, (1890) 42 Minn. 273, 44 N. W. 61, 18 Am. St. Rep.
503.
Re Layman's Will, (1889) 40 Minn. 371, 42 N. W. 286.
To complete the record of cases examined, the following citations
should be added. The cases were eliminated from consideration for
reasons herein indicated.
In re Estate of Hobhaggen, (1923) 154 Minn. 145, 191 N. W. 409.
The question for decision was whether contestants should be allowed to
file objections after the will had been admitted to probate.
In re Estate of Murphy, (1922) 153 Minn. 60, 189 N. W. 413. It
was found the testator had not executed the will, hence the issues here
considered were never reached.
Thill v. Freiermuth, (1916) 132 Minn. 242, 156 N. W. 260. Not a
will case.

